

**WUNDT, WILHELM (1901): ON HUMAN AND ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY**

LECTURE I

I. PHILOSOPHICAL ANTICIPATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY. II. SPIRITUALISM AND MATERIALISM. III. METHODS AND AIDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION.

PSYCHOLOGY, than any other in our own day, shows more clearly any other experiential science traces of the conflict of philosophical systems. We may regret this influence in the interest of psychological investigation, because it has been the chief obstacle in the way of an impartial examination of mental life.

Man himself, not as he appears from without, but as he is in his own immediate experience, is the real problem of psychology.

Whatever else is included in the circle of psychological discussion, the mental life of animals, the common ideas and actions of mankind which spring from similarity of mental nature, and the mental achievements of the individual or of society, all this has reference to the one original problem, however much our understanding of mental life be widened and deepened by the consideration of it. But the questions with which psychology thus comes into contact are at the same time problems for philosophy.

And philosophy had made various attempts to solve them long before psychology as an experiential science had come into being.

The psychology of to-day, then, neither wishes to deny to philosophy its right to occupy itself with these matters, nor is able to dispute the close connection of philosophical and psychological problems. But in one respect it has undergone a radical change of standpoint. It refuses to regard psychological investigation as in any sense dependent upon foregone meta-physical conclusions.

It would rather reverse the relation of psychology to philosophy, just as empirical natural science long ago reversed its relation to natural philosophy, in so far, that is, as it rejected all philosophic speculations which were not based upon experience. Instead of a psychology founded upon philosophical presuppositions, we require a philosophy to whose speculations value is ascribed only so long as they pay regard at every step to the facts of psychological, as well as to those of scientific, experience.

It will, therefore, be a matter of principle for us in these lectures to stand apart from the strife of philosophic systems. But since the thought of to-day is subjected on all sides to the influence of a philosophic past which counts its years by thousands, and since the concepts and general notions under which an undifferentiated philosophy arranged the facts of mental life have become part of the general educated consciousness, and have never ceased to hinder the unprejudiced consideration of things as they are, it is our bounden duty to characterise and judge as they are, it is our bounden duty to justify the standpoint which we propose to adopt. We will, therefore, first of all glance for a moment at the history of philosophy before the appearance of psychology.

Plato was the first among the Greeks to separate mind from body. Mind he regarded as the ruling principle of the body. And this separation paved the way for the future one-sided dualism which considered sensible existence as the obscuring and debasing of an ideal, purely mental being.

Aristotle, who combined with the gift of speculation a marvellous keenness of observation, attempted to harmonise these opposites by regarding mind as the principle which vitalises and informs matter. He saw the direct operation of mental powers in the forms of animals, in the expression of the human figure at rest and in movement, even in the processes of growth and nutrition. And he generalised all this in his conclusion that mind is the creator of all organic form, working upon matter as the sculptor works on marble. Life and mentality were for him identical terms; even the vegetable world was on his theory endowed with mind.

But with the dawn of the modern period begins in psychology, as elsewhere, the return to Platonism. Another influence combined with this to displace Aristotelianism; namely, the development of modern natural science and the mechanical metaphysics which this development brought with it. The result of these influences was the origin of two psychological schools, which have disputed with one another down to the present day, Spiritualism and Materialism.

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Wolff is the originator of the so-called theory of mental faculties, which has influenced psychology down to the present day. This theory, based upon a superficial classification of mental processes, was couched in terms of a number of general notions, memory, imagination, sensibility, understanding, etc., which it regarded as simple and fundamental forces of mind.

### II

When Descartes denied mind to animals, on the ground that the essence of mind consists in thought, and man is the only thinking being, he could have little imagined that this proposition would do as much as the strictly mechanical views which he represented in natural philosophy to further the doctrines which are the direct opposite of the Spiritualism which he taught, the doctrines of modern Materialism.

If animals are natural automata, and if all the phenomena which general belief refers to sensation, feeling, and will are the result of purely mechanical conditions, why should not the same explanation hold of man?

This was the obvious inference which the Materialism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries drew from Descartes' principles.

The naive Materialism with which philosophy began had simply ascribed some kind of corporeality to mental existence. But this modern Materialism took as its first principles physiological hypotheses; thought, sense, and idea are physiological functions of certain organs within the nervous system. Observation of the facts of consciousness is of no avail until these are derived from chemical and physical processes. Thought is simply a result of brain activity.

But this equating of mental process and brain function, which makes psychology a department of cerebral physiology, and therefore apart of a general atomic mechanics, sins against the very first rule of scientific logic, that only those connections of facts may be regarded as causal which obtain between generically similar phenomena.

Our feelings, thoughts, and volitions cannot be made objects of sensible perception.

We can hear the word which expresses the thought, we can see the man who has thought it, we can dissect the brain in which it arose; but the word, the man, and the brain are not the thought. And the blood which circulates in the brain, the chemical changes which take place there, are wholly different from the act of thought itself.

But cerebral processes give us no shadow of indication as to how our mental life comes into being. For the two series of phenomena are not comparable.

But we do not find that Materialism, even in this connection, has made a single noteworthy contribution to our positive knowledge. It has been content to setup baseless hypotheses regarding the dependence of mental function upon physical process; or it has been concerned to refer the nature of mental forces to some known physical agency. No analogy has been too halting, no hypothesis too visionary, for its purpose. It was for some time a matter of dispute whether the mental force had more resemblance to light or to electricity. Only on one point was there general agreement, that it was not ponderable.

### III

We find, then, that Materialism and Spiritualism, which set out from such different postulates, converge in their final result. The most obvious reason of this is their common methodological error. The belief that it was possible to establish a science of mental experience in terms of speculation, and the thought that a chemical and physical investigation of the brain must be the first step towards a scientific psychology led alike to mistakes in method.

For it is experience and reflection which constitute each and every science. Experience comes first; it gives us our bricks: experience comes first; reflection is the mortar, which holds the bricks together. We cannot build without both. Reflection apart from experience and experience without reflection are alike powerless.

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It is therefore essential for scientific progress that the sphere of experience be enlarged, and new instruments of reflection from time to time invented.

But how is it possible to extend our experience of sensations, feelings, and thoughts? Did not mankind feel and think thousands of years ago, as it feels and thinks to-day? It does, indeed, seem as though our observation of what goes on in the mind could never extend beyond the circle to which our own consciousness confines it.

The belief that our observation is confined to the brief span of our individual life, with its scanty experience, was one of the greatest obstacles to psychological progress in the days of the earlier empiricism. And the opening up of the rich mines of experience to which social psychology gives us access, for the extension of our own subjective perceptions, is an event of importance and of promise for the whole circle of the mental sciences.

Even astronomy, a science which we might think must of its very nature be confined to observation, is in its more recent development founded in a certain sense upon experiment. So long as mere observations were taken, the general opinion that the earth was fixed, and that the sun and stars moved round it, could not be overthrown.

It is true that there were many phenomena which made against this belief; but simple observation could not furnish means for the attainment of a better explanation. Then came Copernicus, with the thought: 'Suppose I stand upon the sun!' and henceforth it was the earth that moved, and not the sun; the contradictions of the old theory disappeared, and the new system of the universe had come into being.

But it was an experiment that had led to this, though an experiment of thought. Observation still tells us that the earth is fixed, and the sun moving; and if the opposite view is to become clear, we must just repeat the Copernican experiment, and take our stand upon the sun.

### LECTURE II

I. ANALYSIS OF MENTAL PROCESSES. II. IDEA AND SENSATION. III. INTENSITY AND QUALITY OF SENSATION. IV. MEASUREMENT OF THE INTENSITY OF SENSATION.

I

So soon as ever the dawn of knowledge had broken upon us through the portals of the senses, we began to compare objects, to reflect upon them. The first work of thought was to set things in their places, to transform the chaos of sense impressions into an intelligible cosmos.

But after everything else has been arranged, there still remains something which has as yet no place, ourselves: our feeling, willing, and thinking; so that the question arises: how can our own mental life be made the subject of investigation like the objects of this external world of things about us? And yet can such a question be asked? Is it not really self-contradictory? It is as though we required that the tone should hear itself, or the ray of light be sensed by itself.

It is, indeed, true that here, as we enter upon the study of psychology, a peculiar difficulty presents itself. If we try to observe our mental activities, the observer and the observed object are one and the same. But the most important condition of a trustworthy observation is always thought to consist in the mutual independence of object and observer.

### LECTURE XIV

I. THE FEELINGS. II. SENSE-FEELINGS. III. COMMON FEELING AND THE OTHER TOTAL FEELINGS. IV. RELATION OF FEELING TO IDEA.

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The mental phenomena with which we have been concerned hitherto have represented stages in one and the same great process. We have seen that ideas are derived from sensations in the regular course of development, and that both alike have a single end, knowledge of the external world. But we have purposely neglected one very important side of our purposely mental life. We never actually find a mind which apprehends things without joy or sorrow, and contemplates them with absolute indifference. In cognising objects we feel ourselves attracted to or repelled from them, or incited to the performance of some kind of action, according to their nature.

We can, therefore, comprehend all those phenomena which are not included in the ideational process under the two words 'feeling' and 'will.' Feeling and conation always accompany our sensations and ideas; they determine our actions, and it is mainly from them that our whole mental life receives its bias and stamp of individuality.

As a matter of fact, there is one point in which all 'feelings' agree, however different they may be in other respects: they all imply a condition of the feeling subject, an affection or activity of the self.

### LECTURE XV

#### I. RELATION OF FEELING TO WILL; IMPULSE AND DESIRE. II. DEVELOPMENT OF WILL. III. SIMPLE AND COMPLEX VOLUNTARY ACTS. IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS IN VOLUNTARY ACTION.

It is in the doctrine of feeling and will more than anywhere else that psychology still wears the fetters of the old faculty theory. And so it has usually taken a radically false view of these intimately connected part-processes, regarding each constituent as an independently existing whole, which might incidentally, but need not necessarily, exert an influence upon the constituents of the other. Thus first of all feeling was considered apart from its connection with will, and then desire was treated as a separate process, sometimes found in connection with feeling. Further, impulse was opposed to desire proper as an obscure desire, in which the subject is not conscious of the desired object; or, perhaps, as a lower desire, referring exclusively to the needs of sense. (That is why many, psychologists hold that impulses only exist among animals.) And finally these processes are still further supplemented by the postulation of will as an entirely new and independent faculty, whose function it is to choose between the various objects of desire, or in certain circumstances to act in accordance with purely intellectual motives and in opposition to impulses and desires. According to this theory, that is, will consists in the capacity for free choice. Choice in this sense presupposes the possibility of decision between various objects of desire, and even of decision against the desired object on the ground of purely rational considerations. It was therefore supposed that desire is a condition which precedes volition, and that at least in many cases this latter is only the realisation of desire in action.

We must pronounce this theory a purely imaginary construction from beginning to end. It has taken its facts from every possible source except an unprejudiced introspection. Feeling is not independent of volition, as alleged; impulse is not a process which can be distinguished from will, still less opposed to it; and desire is not the uniform antecedent of will, but rather a process which only appears in consciousness when some inhibition of voluntary activity prevents the realisation of volition proper. Finally, to define the will as the capacity of choice is to render any explanation of it impossible from the outset. Such a capacity presupposes volition as its antecedent condition. If we could not will without choice, i.e., as directly determined by internal motives, a volition involving choice would necessarily remain impossible.

This confusion of volition and choice brings another error in its train. Will is supposed to arise from all sorts of involuntary activities. Generally this view is applied exclusively to external voluntary acts, which many psychologists regard as the only ones. Both the human and animal body, it is said, were originally, before the appearance of will, the seat of reflex movements of the most diverse character. These were for the most part purposive, owing to the teleological connection of sensory with motor fibres in the central organs. Thus a stimulus which caused pain would give rise to a reflex movement of defence, resulting in the removal of the stimulus.

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But the matter assumes a different aspect when we look at it without preconceptions, and refrain from reading into the facts of observation notions and reflections which exist only in our own minds. In the first place, there is not the slightest confirmation to be found for the assertion that the lower animals, and children in the early days of life, are merely reflex machines, which make certain movements with mechanical certainty as soon as we press the spring. Even such of the protozoa as undoubtedly belong to the animal kingdom give plain evidence of voluntary movement.

No one will of course deny that reflex movements may also be observed from the first especially among the more complexly organised animals.

... organisation acquired in the course of countless generations. What are the conditions which have been operative during this development to increasingly modify the organisation of the nervous system, so that the movements which constitute its mechanical response to external stimuli may be as well adapted as possible to subserve the immediate ends of the life of the organism? There is only one intelligible answer to this question. It consists in a reference to those processes which even during the individual life mediate the formation of purposive reflex and automatic movements, to the processes underlying practice. Practice always implies that an action which at first was performed voluntarily has gradually become reflex and automatic.

Thus when the child learns to walk, the taking of each single step is accompanied by a considerable effort of will; but after a time and by slow degrees it becomes able to initiate a whole series of movements without attending to their execution in detail. In the same way, we learn to play the pianoforte or to execute other complicated movements of the hands by frequent repetition of particular and connected acts, and their consequent transformation into a chain of effects which follow each other with mechanical certainty when once the appropriate impulse has been given.

But what is this 'active subject'? The most obvious answer appears to be: the willing subject is our own self. But that answer does not in any way assist our psychological analysis. For what, again, is this 'self' which we are led to look upon as the author of our voluntary actions? When we examine it closely, we see that it is only another expression for the old phrase 'willing subject.' We perceive changes in our conscious content, and refer them to a single subject; then we go on to name these changes 'voluntary actions' and the subject brought in to explain them our 'self.' The only means of determining more exactly the nature of the 'self' is to analyse out what we regard as the cause of our voluntary action in each particular case.

Now the willing self is usually regarded as the immediate cause of voluntary actions, but by no means as their final and only condition. We suppose that the will is determined by condition. We suppose that the will is determined by motives. We assume, of course, that a motive cannot be effective without a willing self; but, on the other hand, we regard it as equally obvious from the facts of our immediate internal experience that a willing self cannot act without motives. The connection between motive and will is, therefore, just as necessary as that between will and active subject.

A reflex, or a passive movement which some external force compels us to make, is not conditioned by motives, although they have causes of their own just as certainly as voluntary actions. Motives are therefore causes of volition; and since volition always arises from internal processes, it is at once clear that they must be internal, psychical causes.

Now what is a motive? It is customary to make a distinction between simple and complex motives, and to comprehend under the latter rubric complex groupings of motives, where the constituents may to some extent operate in different directions. But in giving an account of the particular causes which determine volition, we shall only recognise as determinate motives those which give it a definite direction, and which act like simple forces, incapable of further analysis.

In this sense every motive is a particular idea with an affective tone attaching to it. And since feeling is itself simply a definite voluntary tendency, this combination of idea and feeling in motives only means that an idea becomes a motive as soon as it solicits the will. Hence it is tautological to say that only ideas with a strong affective tone can operate as motives, since it is just the affective tone of an idea which gives it the power of acting as a motive.

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Nevertheless, introspection can show the conditions in virtue of which some ideas become motives and others do not. These conditions are of two kinds, they consist partly in the immediate attributes of sense-impressions, partly in the nature of our previous conscious experiences. All those attributes of sensation which endow it with a vivid affective tone serve also to make the impression effective as a motive to will. In this case it generally happens that the impression, with its strong affective tone, is the only motive present in consciousness: the voluntary action is a simple, or, as it is ordinarily expressed, an impulsive, action. There can be no doubt that the majority of the actions of animals are of this character. But impulses make up a large part of human action also, and especially in the earlier stages of its development. All sense-impulses are simply tendencies to will connected with definite sensations; i.e., they are feelings which have a strong tendency to pass over into actual volition.

But in course of time the mind acquires various dispositions toward the renewal of previous ideas which are themselves connected with definite voluntary tendencies. An external stimulus will not any longer simply call out the impulse corresponding to it; but this impulse will increasingly tend to influence and be influenced by the dispositions already existing in the mind.

On the other hand, we can know nothing whatever of the influence which may be exerted by the dispositions that never become realised in idea at all upon the changes in our ideational content, and so upon the final act of will. The links which join the actual current processes with the past history of consciousness simply serve to bring out with unmistakable clearness the general fact that the determining ground of action has not been any single impression, nor any particular motive, whether called up by association or arising 'of itself,' but the entire trend or tendency of the mind, which has its roots in the original nature of consciousness and the accumulated experience of the mental life.

The action which results from this plurality of conflicting motives we call a complex voluntary action or a volitional action. It possesses two distinguishing marks in consciousness, first, the feeling of a decision, preceding the action and based upon the connection of the present impression with past experiences; and secondly, the idea of the voluntary act as determined by a choice between different and conflicting motives. Either one of these characteristics may be more or less distinct. The clearness of the perception of either usually stands in inverse ratio to that of the other. The feeling of decision is predominant where the voluntary act occurs at once and with complete certainty; the feeling of choice prevails where there is a long preliminary conflict of motives.

### IV

One very important attribute of volition, which affects all the elements of voluntary action which we have here cited, is its unity. Despite the conflict of motives and the oscillations of feeling conditioned by it, the voluntary act itself at any given moment must be single and unitary. This fact is the basis of the unity of the self. By a hysteron proteron which often recurs in psychology we tend to regard the latter as the cause of the unity of volition. But, as a matter of fact, what we call our 'self' is simply this unity of volition plus the univocal control of our mental life which it renders possible.

## LECTURE XVI

I. THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS. II. CONDITION OF IDEAS IN CONSCIOUSNESS. III. PERCEPTION AND APPERCEPTION; CLEARNESS AND DISTINCTNESS OF IDEAS. IV. PHENOMENA ACCOMPANYING APPERCEPTION. V. ATTENTION. VI. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

What is 'consciousness'? Much attention has been devoted to this question in modern times both by philosophers and psychologists. There could be no doubt that the word denoted some phase or aspect of our mental life, and was not identical with any of the other concepts, like 'idea,' 'feeling,' 'will,' etc., which we apply to particular mental processes and states. So that the view naturally suggested itself that consciousness is a special mental condition, requiring to be defined by certain characteristic marks. And the feeling that it was necessary to oppose to consciousness an unconscious mental existence promoted this opinion. Ideas, affective processes, may vanish and then again appear. It is therefore inferred that after leaving consciousness they have continued to exist in an unconscious state, and at times return to their former condition.

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From this point of view, nothing is more natural than to think of consciousness as a kind of stage upon which our ideas are the actors, appearing, withdrawing behind the scenes, and coming on again when their cue is given. And the notion has become so popular that many philosophers and psychologists consider it much more interesting to learn what takes place behind the scenes, in unconsciousness, than what occurs in consciousness.

Every-day experience, it is supposed, has made the latter familiar to us; but we know nothing of the unconscious, and to learn something about it would be a really interesting addition to our knowledge.

There is scarcely any view which has been a greater source of error in psychology than that which regards ideas as imperishable objects which may appear and disappear, press and jostle each other, objects to which, it is true, additions are at times made through the action of the senses, but which, when once they have come into being, are only distinguished by the variation in their distribution in consciousness and unconsciousness, or at most, by the different degrees of clearness which they possess in consciousness.

As a matter of fact, ideas, like all other mental experiences, are not objects, but processes, occurrences.

If ideas are not imperishable facts, but transitory processes which recur in more or less altered form, the whole of this hypothetical structure falls to the ground. And at the same time the unconscious loses the significance ascribed to it as an especial kind of mental existence, which, though not itself consciousness, might at any rate enable us to determine the characteristics or conditions which must attach to the objects of mind in order that they may become conscious.

In the same way, all attempts to define consciousness as a particular mental fact co-ordinate with our other internal experiences have proved fruitless.

It is obvious that those who would regard it as the capacity of internal observation, as a kind of 'Internal sense,' commit in this analogy an error similar to that involved in its comparison to a stage. The perceiving organ and the perceived object are two different things; consciousness and conscious process are not. The activity of observation, of attention, is of course found among what we call conscious processes.

We distinguish in consciousness, it is said, a whole number of ideas. Therefore consciousness must possess the capacity of discrimination; the word must be equivalent to discriminating activity. But here again the question arises whether the discrimination of processes directly perceived is the antecedent condition of these processes, or whether it is not rather a result to which they are essential. In the first place, the objects must be there to be distinguished.

It is in this way that the concept of the self ('I') arises: a concept which, taken of itself, is completely contentless, but which, as a matter of fact, never comes into the field of introspection without the special determinations which give a content to it. Psychologically regarded, therefore, the self is not an idea among other ideas; it is not even a secondary characteristic, common to all or to the great majority of ideas; it is simply and solely the perception of the interconnection of internal experience which accompanies that experience itself.

Now we have already seen that perceptions of this kind, perceptions which refer to the occurrence of a process, the manner in which it runs its course, and soon, are sometimes transposed back again into ideas. There is a deep-rooted tendency to hypostatise mental events, a tendency evinced by those theories which have regarded ideas themselves as permanent objects (pp. 221, 222). And there is a very special tendency to transpose the 'self' into an idea of this character, though, as a matter of fact, it is nothing more than the way in which ideas and the other mental processes are connected together.

Since, further, the manner of this connection at any particular moment is conditioned by preceding mental events, we tend to include under the term 'self' the whole circle of effects which have their causes in former experiences.

The 'self' is regarded as a total force which determines particular events as they happen, unless, of course, they are occasioned by the action of external impressions or of those internal processes which we experience just as passively as we do the external.

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And since the principal effect of the preconditions of consciousness is the determination of the appearance and degree of clearness of ideas, we further bring the 'self' into the very closest connection with the process of apperception. The self is the subject which we supply for the apperceptive activity.

It is plain enough that there is involved here a transference of the relations observed in external perception to the sphere of internal experience. The self, you see, is regarded after the analogy of external objects, which we take to be the same in spite of variation in their properties, because the variation is always continuous both in time and space. But without the continuity of our mental life we should not be able to cognise the continuity of objective things; so that in this interplay of developments we have the self figuring both as cause and effect.

The perception of the interconnection of mental processes, which crystallises in the concept of the 'self,' renders possible the distinction between objects and their changing properties; and this distinction in its turn inclines us to ascribe an objective value to the concept.

### LECTURE XVII

I. DEVELOPMENT OF ATTENTION ; PASSIVE AND ACTIVE APPERCEPTION. II. ATTENTION AND WILL; FLUCTUATIONS OF ATTENTION. III. RANGE OF CONSCIOUSNESS; FORMATION AND DIVISION OF RHYTHMICAL SERIES.

With the development of self-consciousness, which we described in the previous lecture, proceeds the development of another complex process, that of attention. The two developments are in many respects similar.

States of attention, like those of self-consciousness, present certain external differences which may be regarded as opposites; though it is true that, to place the opposition in a clear light, we must more or less neglect intermediate processes which would enable us to pass from one to the other. For the extreme cases, however theoretically possible, never actually occur in the purity in which they can be obtained by analysis. However, if we disregard the concrete for a moment, we shall find evidence enough for the general possibility of the extreme cases.

### LECTURE XXI

I. CONCEPTS AND JUDGMENTS. II. DISTINGUISHING MARKS OF INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES. III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONS. IV. MENTAL DERANGEMENT

But it is equally plain that the inference so often drawn, 'all ideational connections are associations,' is wholly unjustifiable. This inference has its source in an error with which we are already familiar that which transformed the forms of association into 'laws of association.' It rests upon the supposition that these forms are themselves elementary processes, whereas they are really, as we have seen, complex products resulting from the elementary connections by likeness and contiguity. But while we grant that all the possible interrelations of ideas are reducible to these two elementary types, we do not mean to assert that the association-products can be exhaustively and without exception classified under the heads of simultaneous and successive association.

There is one limitation which must not be disregarded. We never speak of association except where the elements which mediate the connection belong to a restricted circle of ideas. Thus assimilation is confined to perceptions of so homogeneous a character that they can be connected to form one single idea, complication to disparate impressions, which are inseparable concomitants in perception.

The same thing holds of successive associations by similarity and contiguity, which, you remember, only differ from simultaneous associations in the (specially conditioned) temporal separation of the individual acts of ideation.

Now there can be no question that we find processes in consciousness which are inexplicable in terms of these associations between similar or frequently connected perceptions, although, certainly presupposing the existence of the association-products.

### LECTURE XXII



I. DREAMS. II. SLEEP-WALKING. III. HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION. IV. AUTOSUGGESTION AND POST-HYPNOTIC INFLUENCE. V. ERRORS OF THE 'HYPNOTISM-PSYCHOLOGY.' VI. THEORY OF HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION.

We have seen that a person of sound mind is able of his own will to give himself up to the play of association, and so induce a state of mind which more or less resembles the ideational condition of the insane. That is not all, however. We are all of us normally subject to experiences which bring us still closer to a realisation of mental disturbance. One such condition of what we may call normal temporary insanity is that of dreaming.

Mankind tends always to regard the unaccustomed as more wonderful than the usual and normal. The glamour of mystery surrounds the unfamiliar, just because it is unfamiliar; while the commonest phenomena, which so often present the really most difficult problems, are looked upon as matters of course.

Former ages regarded the insane as favoured of Heaven and illuminated above their fellows, or as possessed of devils, - according as the pendulum of circumstance swung. And even to-day the subjective ideas of these unfortunates are at times affected by such thoughts: thoughts which arose in the first place from the contemplation of mental derangement in its various forms. Even after this view had died out as regards insanity, dreams were still invested with something of the miraculous.

The popular belief in premonition by dreams we need not notice. But there are still philosophers who incline to think that when we dream the mind has burst the fetters of the body; and that dream-fancies transcend the activity of the waking consciousness, with its close confinement to the limits of space and time.

LECTURE XXIII

I. PROBLEMS OF ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY ; DEFICIENCIES OF THE SCIENCE. II. METHODOLOGICAL RULES. III. ACTS OF COGNITION AND RECOGNITION AMONG ANIMALS. IV. ASSOCIATION AMONG THE LOWER ANIMALS.

The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world.

Then the observation of animals is the more important matter; man is only considered as one, though, of course, the highest, of the developmental stages to be examined. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man. You will remember that we decided at the outset of these lectures to deal with animal psychology in this second sense, and for the more limited purpose.

So that Bacon's comparison of the insufficient observation of nature by the Aristotelians of his day to the report of an ambassador who based his knowledge of the measures of a Government upon town gossip, and not upon accurate examination, applies fairly enough to the animal psychology of our own time. It is permeated through and through by the concepts of the every-day psychology, which is thought to suffice for the requirements of ordinary life, and too often also for the sciences which cannot do without psychological reference. The one great defect of this popular psychology is, that it does not take mental processes for what they show themselves to be to a direct and unprejudiced view, but imports into them the reflections of the observer about them.

The necessary consequence for animal psychology is, that the mental actions of animals, from the lowest to the highest, are interpreted as acts of the understanding. If any vital manifestation of the organism is capable of possible derivation from a series of reflections and inferences, that is taken as sufficient proof that these reflections and inferences actually led up to it. And, indeed, in the absence of a careful analysis of our subjective perceptions, we can hardly avoid this conclusion.

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This mistake, then, springs from ignorance of exact psychological methods. It is, unfortunately, often rendered worse by the inclination of animal psychologists to see the intellectual achievements of animals in the most brilliant light. This, of course, is due to the natural pleasure which the objects of our observation always give us, and which is the most effective spur to continuous devotion to a particular subject.

These considerations lead up to a question which it is important to raise with regard to the study of animal psychology in regard to the study of animal psychology general. We have no other means of estimating the mental processes of animals than in the light of those of our own consciousness. We must employ these in such a way as to gain the best and surest knowledge possible of the animal mind.